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OBJECTIVE: To analyze the prevalence and types of prescribing and dispensing errors occurring with high-alert
medications and to propose preventive measures to avoid errors with these medications.
INTRODUCTION: The prevalence of adverse events in health care has increased, and medication errors are probably
the most common cause of these events. Pediatric patients are known to be a high-risk group and are an important
target in medication error prevention.
METHODS: Observers collected data on prescribing and dispensing errors occurring with high-alert medications for
pediatric inpatients in a university hospital. In addition to classifying the types of error that occurred, we identified
cases of concomitant prescribing and dispensing errors.
RESULTS: One or more prescribing errors, totaling 1,632 errors, were found in 632 (89.6%) of the 705 high-alert
medications that were prescribed and dispensed. We also identified at least one dispensing error in each high-alert
medication dispensed, totaling 1,707 errors. Among these dispensing errors, 723 (42.4%) content errors occurred
concomitantly with the prescribing errors. A subset of dispensing errors may have occurred because of poor
prescription quality. The observed concomitancy should be examined carefully because improvements in the
prescribing process could potentially prevent these problems.
CONCLUSION: The system of drug prescribing and dispensing at the hospital investigated in this study should be
improved by incorporating the best practices of medication safety and preventing medication errors. High-alert
medications may be used as triggers for improving the safety of the drug-utilization system.
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INTRODUCTION
Medication is the mainstay of health care. However, the
risks of drug therapy and the prevalence of adverse effects
have increased, most likely due to an increased number of
medication errors.1-3
The pediatric population is known to be a high-risk
group, and the number of potential adverse drug events is
generally higher in pediatric inpatients than in the adult
inpatient population.4-6
A systematic review of the literature on incidents in a
neonatal intensive care unit revealed that medication errors
were the most frequently reported patient safety event.7 A
study of five United Kingdom hospitals investigated the
incidence and type of prescribing and administration errors
in pediatric patients and found a 13.2% prescribing and a
19.1% administration error rate.6
The need to calculate doses according to the age, weight,
and body surface area of children increases the possibility of
errors compared to adult patients.8,9 Ambiguous, incom-
plete, or confusing prescriptions may result in incorrectly
understanding drug prescriptions, which in turn can lead to
problems in drug dispensing and administration.10-13
Researchers, health care professionals, and institutions
have proposed action plans and mechanisms to decrease
medication errors and increase patient safety. Monitoring a
group of drugs classified as high-alert medications (HAMs)
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by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP, United
States of America) is one such approach. This measure is
important because the consequences for patients may be
severe when there are errors in any or all stages of the use
process of such drugs.14
With this background in mind, the purpose of this study
was to analyze the prevalence and types of prescribing and
dispensing errors in a pediatric unit of a Brazilian university
hospital that occurred on prescription order forms contain-
ing one or more HAMs and to propose preventive measures
for these errors.
METHODS
A descriptive cross-sectional research study was carried
out in the Pharmacy Department of a Brazilian 476-bed
university hospital. We focused on prescriptions from the
pediatric unit during the 30-day period between October 6th
and November 4th 2008. The relevant institutional review
board approved the study.
The pediatric unit has 60 beds and provides health care to
several types of medium- and high-complexity medical and
surgical patients. Some medications, including some HAMs,
are dispensed for replenishing the standard inventory of the
pediatric unit. Patient-specific drugs are provided indivi-
dually for each 24-hour period based on copies of each
patient’s prescription order forms.
A 30-day period was defined for gathering the data.
According to a review by the Medical Records Department,
this time interval is representative of the care provided by
the pediatric unit.
All copies of the patient-specific prescription order forms
containing one or more HAMs for pediatric inpatients that
were received in the dispensing sector of the pharmacy
between 7 a.m. and 9 p.m. within the data-gathering period
were included in the study. We used the list of HAMs as
defined by the ISMP to select the prescription order forms.15
Prescription orders for parenteral nutrition, chemother-
apy and hemodialysis were excluded because these medica-
tions are not dispensed by the hospital pharmacy
dispensary.
The data were collected by the principal author with
assistance from undergraduate pharmacy students. Three
training sessions on the use of the data-gathering instru-
ments were provided for all participants.
No actions or comments were made regarding the
pharmacy service during the data-gathering period, and
the dispensing process remained unaltered to minimize
observation bias. The principal author coordinated and
supervised the data gathering and completion of the forms.
The investigators were asked to inform the supervising
hospital pharmacist on duty about any issues detected
during that data gathering that might have caused risk to
the patient.
Definitions and classification
Prescription errors. The HAM prescription errors were
classified based on the definitions established by Dean
et al.16 and Rosa et al.13 These classifications were adapted
for the HAM use processes and standards at the study site.
We therefore included as errors any prescription for which
the dosage form, concentration, administration route, dose
interval, dilution, or infusion rate (where applicable) were
not present in the HAM prescription. Prescribing errors
were then classified as follows.
Name of the HAM: The name of medication was
incomplete.
Dosage form: The dosage form was incorrect, absent, or
unclear (leading to doubts about the proper interpretation).
Concentration, Administration route, Dose interval,
Dilution: One of these elements of the prescription was
incorrect, absent, or unclear (leading to doubts about the
interpretation).
Dose and Infusion rate: Either the dose or the infusion
rate was higher than indicated, lower than indicated,
unclear, or absent according to the guidelines described by
Takemoto.17
Denomination of the HAM: Either the chemical name or
the trade name was used instead of the generic name.
Legibility: The prescription components were poorly
legible or illegible, according to the classification proposed in
Rosa et al.13
The dilution and/or infusion rates were evaluated only
for the HAMs administrated by infusion.
Dispensing errors. Dispensing errors were identified by
checking the prescribed drug against the dispensed
medication. The dispensing errors were classified into
types and subtypes according to the method of Beso
et al.18, with adaptations for the medication use processes
in place at the study site, which are described below.
Content errors. Our study added dose interval, dilution,
and HAM denomination to the variables included in Beso
et al.’s18 classification of errors. An error was assigned when
a given dosage form, concentration, and/or dose was not in
the prescription order but the medication was dispensed
nonetheless. We used the following error classifications.
Dosage form: The form dispensed differed from that
prescribed or the drug was dispensed without the pharma-
ceutical form having been specified by the prescriber.
Concentration: The drug was dispensed at a higher or
lower dose than that specified in the order, or the drug was
prescribed and dispensed without the concentration being
specified.
Drug: The dispensed drug was different from the drug
prescribed in the order, or the drug was dispensed without
being prescribed.
Dose interval: The medication was dispensed without the
dose interval having been prescribed.
Dose: The medication was dispensed at a higher or lower
dose than ordered, the drug was dispensed without the dose
having been specified clearly or the HAM was dispensed
without confirming an unusual or unexpected dose.
Dilution: The medication was dispensed at an incorrect
dilution or without a prescription for a given dilution.
HAMNomenclature: The medication was dispensed using
a different nomenclature than that prescribed, without
informing the prescriber. Nomenclature errors included
deviations from how the drug was prescribed (in terms of
generic name, brand name, or chemical name).
Quality deviation: The medication dispensed had altered
physical-chemical, microbiological, and/or organoleptic
characteristics that were recognizable in the dispensing
process, such as an overdue or absent expiration date or
damage to the original packaging.
Labeling errors. The presence of labeling errors, such as
incorrect patient and/or drug identification, was verified as
instructed by the study worksite, as instructed.
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Documentation errors. The name of the person who
dispensed the HAM was poorly legible, illegible or absent in
the copy of the prescription order form.
Concomitant prescribing and dispensing errors. Prescr-
ibing and dispensing errors were analyzed using the
definitions outlined above. We considered prescribing and
dispensing errors to be concomitant when it was clear that
the prescribing error was the cause of, or closely related to, a
dispensing error of the same type.
Analysis
The data were entered into a database created using the
Epi Info version 6 software. The descriptive and analytical
statistics were obtained from the Epi Info software (version
6, CDC, Atlanta, USA) and R software (2.7.1 Version, R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).
Each prescribed HAM could be associated with more than
one dispensing error and/or more than one prescribing
error.
The association between concomitant prescribing and
dispensing errors was determined using Fisher’s exact test.
RESULTS
During the 30-day study period, the dispensing sector
received 2,571 copies of prescription order forms for
pediatric inpatients. Of these, 2,433 (94.6%) arrived between
7 a.m. and 9 p.m. and thus potentially met our inclusion
criteria. Among the 2,433 copies, 823 (33.8%) contained one
or more HAMs and were therefore selected for analysis.
Among the 8,875 medications prescribed in the 823
selected prescription order forms, 1,610 (18.1%) were
HAMs. Of these 1,610 HAM, 900 (55.9%) were not dis-
pensed, primarily because they were standard inventory
medications. The remaining 710 (44.1%) were dispensed.
The 710 dispensed HAMs consisted of 638 (89.9%)
medications for individual use and 72 (10.1%) medications
from the standard inventory. Five (0.7%) of the 710
prescribed HAMs were dispensed without being evaluated
by the researchers and were thus considered to be missing
data. Among the remaining 705 HAMs, a drug other than
the prescribed medication was dispensed in five instances
(0.8%). These instances involved codeine and paracetamol
being dispensed instead of codeine, heparin being dis-
pensed instead of enoxaparin, morphine instead of trama-
dol, and two cases of adrenaline being dispensed instead of
noradrenaline. Analysis of the remaining variables related
to dispensing errors was therefore possible for 700 HAMs
(Figure 1).
Prescribing errors
There were one or more prescribing errors in 632 (89.6%)
of the 705 HAMs that were prescribed and dispensed,
totaling 1,632 errors (Table 1). The HAM dose was too high
in 33 (4.7%) cases, too low in 10 cases (1.3%), unclear in 319
(45.3%) cases, and absent in 7 (1.0%) cases. The HAM
infusion rate was unclear in 110 (20.8% of HAMs adminis-
tered via infusion) cases and absent in 159 (30.1%) cases. The
prescription components that were poorly legible included
the name of the HAM (6.7%), its concentration (6.4%), its
dose (6.1%), and its infusion rate (5.4%). The lack of clarity
in these prescription components created predispos-
ing conditions for potential dispensing errors. Of the
632 HAMs in this study with one or more prescribing
errors, the three drugs most frequently associated with
prescription errors were injectable midazolam (5 mg/ml) at
22.3% (n = 141), fentanyl (0.05 mg/ml) at 18.4% (n = 116) and
morphine (10 mg/ml) at 13.4% (n = 85). The mean number
of errors per prescribed HAM was 2.6 (Table 1).
Dispensing errors
There was at least one dispensing error in each HAM
dispensed. There were 1,707 dispensing errors in total, of
which 768 (45.0%) were content errors, 305 (17.8%) were
labeling errors, and 634 (37.2%) were documentation errors
(Table 2). Dispensing a HAM without the dosage form being
specified on the prescription occurred in 615 (87.9%) of the
dispensed HAMs. In addition, 32 (4.6%) of the HAMs were
dispensed with a different denomination than that pre-
scribed, without providing information to the staff admin-
istering the medication that the drugs were equivalent. All
305 of the HAM-dispensing envelopes had one or more
labeling errors.
Information regarding the name of the person responsible
for dispensing the 705 prescribed HAMs was unclear in 263
(37.3%) cases, illegible in 282 (40.0%) cases and absent in 89
(12.6%) cases. The mean number of dispensing errors per
HAM was 2.4.
Concomitant prescribing and dispensing errors
Among the dispensing errors recorded in this study, 723
(42.4%) were concomitant with prescription errors, all of
which were content errors (Table 3). There was a statistically
significant association (p,0.0001) between these concomi-
tant prescribing and dispensing errors. They were distrib-
uted as follows: the dosage form was absent in 613 (84.8%)
of the cases; the dose was unclear or absent in 60 (8.3%) of
the cases; no dose interval was indicated in 21 (2.9%) of the
cases; 15 (2.1%) of the cases involved HAMs being
prescribed by their trade or chemical name; the concentra-
tion was absent or incorrect in 11 (1.5%) of the cases; the
dilution was absent or incorrect in 3 (0.4%) of the cases.
Injectable solutions of midazolam (5 mg/ml) and fentanyl
(50 mcg/ml) were the HAMs in which concomitant pre-
scribing and dispensing errors occurred most often.
DISCUSSION
Of the 1,707 dispensing errors that were detected in this
study, 723 (42.4%) occurred concomitantly with prescribing
errors. This association may be explained by prescription
quality being a predisposing factor for dispensing
errors.13,19-22
The most frequent prescribing and dispensing error was
the lack of a specified dosage form, an error that occurred in
613 (84.8%) of the prescribed HAMs. The second most
frequent error was unclear or absent doses, which occurred
in 60 (8.3%) of the prescribed HAMs. The third most
common error was the lack of a specified dose interval,
which occurred in 21 (2.9%) instances and could potentially
have resulted in incorrect doses. These results are consistent
with other studies of pediatric populations in Brazil and in
other countries that have indicated dose-related medication
errors as the most frequent errors.6,22-24
These three types of errors represent a major safety
concern because patients may receive the wrong doses of
these high-alert drugs. Correctly expressing all prescription
components is essential for patient safety. Poorly legible
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prescriptions or omissions of prescription components
compromise the efficacy of any medication dispensing
system and can result in dispensing errors that lead to
inappropriate drug administration.11,13,22,25
An analysis of the HAM nomenclature revealed that the
medication trade name was used in 2.1% of cases and that the
chemical name was used in 4.8% of cases. A study of
prescribing errors in a university hospital in Northeastern
Brazil revealed that the medication trade name was used in
30.8% of their cases.26 In contrast, Dean et al.16 conducted a
study in England in which the use of a brand name instead of
the generic name was not considered a prescription error. The
institution in which our study was conducted belongs to the
Brazilian public health system, where local regulations mandate
the use of generic drug names in prescription order forms.27,28
Among the 11 cases of dispensing errors related to drug
concentrations, three involved heparin. In two of these
cases, the concentration was absent, and the dispensed
concentration was incorrect in the third. In these instances,
the person in charge of dispensing dispensed what he or she
thought had been prescribed without consulting the
prescriber. Rosa et al.13 mention heparin as one of the
HAMs associated with a high incidence of prescription
errors. Two versions of heparin are available at our study
institution; one consists of (5,000 units/ml, in 5 ml vials) and
the other has four times this concentration (20,000 units/ml
Figure 1 - A description of the selection process for prescriptions with high-alert medications (HAM).
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in 0.25 ml vials). Thus, dispensing and administration errors
involving this HAMs may cause serious harm.
Respiratory depression, apnea, respiratory arrest, and/or
cardiac arrest may occur if inappropriate doses of certain
HAMs, such as midazolam, morphine, and fentanyl, are
used. It is important to note that these drugs represent some
of the HAMs in our study with the highest error
prevalences.29,30
We identified situations in which morphine (10 mg) was
prescribed without the dosage form being specified, situa-
tions in which an injectable solution was dispensed when a
tablet was also available at a 10 mg concentration and an
example of fentanyl being prescribed at the wrong
concentration (50 mg/ml). We also observed an instance
of fentanyl (0.05 mg/ml) being dispensed without asking
for confirmation from the prescriber.
Involving pharmacists as reviewers of prescription order
forms prior to dispensing any medication is an important
intervention that promotes detecting and preventing med-
ication errors. Support for the efficacy of this approach has
been confirmed in the current literature through reports
indicating that this process can help intercept potential
problems or errors, thereby preventing harm to patients.30-31
Pediatric patients may also benefit from electronic
prescriptions. Several studies have shown that the use of
such prescriptions significantly reduces medication errors;
the improved organization, clinical support, and legibility of
electronic prescriptions are the main reasons.32-33 However,
recent studies have also suggested that electronic prescrip-
tions, although they can increase process safety, have their
own potential for generating errors as a result of technolo-
gical and/or organizational factors. Thus, after implement-
ing an electronic system, hospitals should attempt to
identify the critical error points and create appropriate
preventive measures.34
In our study, the prevalence of HAMs with poorly legible
names was 6.7%, which was higher than Rosa et al. 3.7%
rate reported in a previous study of a trauma hospital.13 It is
possible that this discrepancy is attributable to differing
specificities of care in pediatric units. Work efficiency may
be compromised when a professional has to spend time
deciphering what is written in a prescription, a situation
that also likely increases the probability of medication
errors.35
Considering the significant rates of prescribing errors that
have been found in studies published by Rose et al.13, Neri 26
and Ghaleb et al. 6 as well as the dispensing errors identified
by Anacleto et al.11, Costa et al.24 and Beso et al.,18 we can
conclude that reducing medication errors should be a priority
in implementing a program for the safe use of medication in
hospitals.
Health professionals are primarily responsible for pre-
venting medication errors and for promoting safe drug-use
practices. However, the pharmaceutical industry, the
hospital equipment industry, and the medical device
industry can also play a significant role in preventing these
types of errors. It is important to highlight that ensuring safe
drug-use practices is the responsibility of all participants
involved in implementing drug safety.1,3
Recommended activities for increasing the safety of
pediatric patients and the efficiency of medication manage-
ment have been described in the literature. These recom-
mendations include implementing activities to foster good
prescription practices, including implementing an electronic
prescription system with proper clinical support, having
pharmacists review prescription order forms before dispen-
sing medications, and using certain HAMs as triggers for
improving the safety in the drug-utilization system.
There are some limitations to this study. For example, the
30-day data collection period may not have been represen-
tative of the rest of the year due to the potential
confounding effects of seasonal changes in prescribing
practices and/or alterations in staff experience. In addition,
the data were gathered only between 7 a.m. and 9 p.m.;
thus, the 138 (5.4%) prescription order forms that arrived
after 9 p.m. were not evaluated. Among these 138 prescrip-
tions, 37 were for HAMs, of which 14 were dispensed. Thus,
the sample was largely representative of the studied
organization despite not being collected over the entire
24 hours of each day.
The classification of prescribing and dispensing errors
that was applied here was adapted to the work processes
and standards of the studied institution. Because of the
variability in medication use processes that exists between
institutions, the generalizability of our results is somewhat
compromised. In addition, researcher interference may
Table 1 - The prevalence of prescribing errors for high-
alert medications (HAM) in relation to the prescription
components and legibility.
Error
N %
Components of prescription order form 1411
Name of HAM 5 0.3
Dosage form 617 37.9
Concentration 38 2.3
Administration route 7 0.4
Dose interval 52 3.2
Dose 369 22.6
Infusion rate 269 16.5
Dilution 5 0.3
Denomination of HAM 49 3.0
Legibility 221
Poorly legible 218 13.3
Illegible 3 0.2
Total 1,632 100.0
Table 2 - The prevalence of dispensing error types and
subtypes.
Type of dispensing error Error
N %
Content 768
Dosage form 615 35.9
Concentration 12 0.7
Drug 5 0.4
Dose interval 21 1.2
Quantity (dose) 77 4.5
Dilution/reconstitution 3 0.2
Denomination of HAM 32 1.9
Quality deviation 3 0.2
Labeling 305
Labeling issues 305 17.8
Documentation 634
Name of person in charge of separation 634 37.2
Total 1,707 100.0
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occur when evaluating prescription legibility, which is a
subjective variable.
CONCLUSION
The concomitant prescribing and dispensing errors found
in this study require additional research to explore the
relationship between these errors and the causes of these
findings.
The dispensing errors encountered in this study under-
line failures in the dispensing system, which was unable to
intercept a significant number of prescribing errors, thereby
generating opportunities for errors in drug administration.
The system for prescribing and dispensing drugs in the
investigated hospital should be improved by incorporating
the best safety practices for preventing medication errors.
High-alert medications may be used as triggers for improv-
ing the safety of drug-utilization system.
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